Unintented consequences of German stock delisting legislation
Olivier Gossner and Michael Florig
CREST WP, 2023
Abstract: The German stock exchange act enables a company’s management to delist the shares without shareholder consent, provided a sponsor of the delisting offers to acquire outstanding shares at a price equal to at least a six month average of the share price. We capture the economic impact of this legislation in a model in which management has the option to delist the stock after public re- lease of information. Delistings are likely to follow positive news on the asset value, which depresses the stock value even before informa- tion is released. This makes the option to delist even more attractive and generates a downwards self-reinforcing loop on stock price. Such unintended consequences of the legislation could be mitigated via mandatory shareholder consent, similar to the current French or UK legislation, by giving minority shareholders an appraisal right as in the US, or by requiring an independent expert evaluation.