The value of information in zero-sum games
The value of information in zero-sum games — working paper, June 2020 version
Abstract
We study the description and value of information in zero-sum games. We define a series of informational relations between information schemes, and show that informational equivalence classes are captured by canonical information structures. Moreover, two information schemes induce the same value in every game if and only if they are informationally equivalent. We prove the existence of a revealing game in which unique optimal strategies are homeomorphic to canonical types.
Working paper, June 2020 version
The downloadable manuscript is dated June 2020.
Citation
BibTeX citation:
@report{gossner2020,
author = {Gossner, Olivier and Mertens, Jean-François},
title = {The Value of Information in Zero-Sum Games},
date = {2020},
url = {https://gossner.me/papers/the-value-of-information-in-zero-sum-games.html},
langid = {en},
abstract = {We study the description and value of information in
zero-sum games. We define a series of informational relations
between information schemes, and show that informational equivalence
classes are captured by canonical information structures. Moreover,
two information schemes induce the same value in every game if and
only if they are informationally equivalent. We prove the existence
of a revealing game in which unique optimal strategies are
homeomorphic to canonical types.}
}
For attribution, please cite this work as:
Gossner, Olivier, and Jean-François Mertens. 2020. The Value of
Information in Zero-Sum Games. https://gossner.me/papers/the-value-of-information-in-zero-sum-games.html.