Strategic Type Spaces
Strategic Type Spaces — Olivier Gossner, Rafael Veiel
Abstract
We provide a strategic foundation for information: in any given game with incomplete information we define strategic quotients as information representations that are sufficient for players to compute best-responses to other players. We prove 1/ existence and essential uniqueness of a minimal strategic quotient called the Strategic Type Space (STS) in which a type is given by an interim correlated rationalizability hierarchy and represents a set of beliefs over other players’ types and nature that rationalize this hierarchy and 2/ that the minimal STS has a recursive structure that is captured by a finite automaton.
arXiv:2606.08297, 2026
Citation
BibTeX citation:
@report{gossner2026,
author = {Gossner, Olivier and Veiel, Rafael},
publisher = {arXiv},
title = {Strategic {Type} {Spaces}},
number = {2606.08297},
date = {2026},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.08297},
doi = {10.48550/arXiv.2606.08297},
langid = {en},
abstract = {We provide a strategic foundation for information: in any
given game with incomplete information we define strategic quotients
as information representations that are sufficient for players to
compute best-responses to other players. We prove 1/ existence and
essential uniqueness of a minimal strategic quotient called the
Strategic Type Space (STS) in which a type is given by an interim
correlated rationalizability hierarchy and represents a set of
beliefs over other players’ types and nature that rationalize this
hierarchy and 2/ that the minimal STS has a recursive structure that
is captured by a finite automaton.}
}
For attribution, please cite this work as:
Gossner, Olivier, and Rafael Veiel. 2026. Strategic Type
Spaces. 2606.08297. arXiv. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.08297.