Secret correlation in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
Secret correlation in repeated games with imperfect monitoring — Mathematics of Operations Research, 32: 413–424, 2007
Abstract
We characterize the maximum payoff that a team can guarantee against another in a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal tradeoff for the team between optimization of stage payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation.
Mathematics of Operations Research, 32: 413–424, 2007
Citation
BibTeX citation:
@article{gossner2007,
author = {Gossner, Olivier and Tomala, Tristan},
title = {Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect
Monitoring},
journal = {Mathematics of Operations Research},
date = {2007},
url = {https://gossner.me/papers/secret-correlation-in-repeated-games-with-imperfect-monitoring.html},
langid = {en},
abstract = {We characterize the maximum payoff that a team can
guarantee against another in a class of repeated games with
imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal tradeoff for
the team between optimization of stage payoffs and generation of
signals for future correlation.}
}
For attribution, please cite this work as:
Gossner, Olivier, and Tristan Tomala. 2007. “Secret Correlation in
Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring.” Mathematics of
Operations Research. https://gossner.me/papers/secret-correlation-in-repeated-games-with-imperfect-monitoring.html.