Optimal use of communication resources

Optimal use of communication resources — Econometrica, 74: 1603-1636, 2006
Authors

Olivier Gossner

Penélope Hernández

and Abraham Neyman

Abstract

We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.

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Econometrica, 74: 1603-1636, 2006

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Citation

BibTeX citation:
@article{gossner2006,
  author = {Gossner, Olivier and Hernández, Penélope and Abraham Neyman,
    and},
  title = {Optimal Use of Communication Resources},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  date = {2006},
  url = {https://gossner.me/papers/optimal-use-of-communication-resources.html},
  langid = {en},
  abstract = {We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about
    a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the
    better-informed player can communicate some or all of his
    information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded
    communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and
    contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by
    definition entail no communication costs.}
}
For attribution, please cite this work as:
Gossner, Olivier, Penélope Hernández, and and Abraham Neyman. 2006. “Optimal Use of Communication Resources.” Econometrica. https://gossner.me/papers/optimal-use-of-communication-resources.html.