The Folk Theorem for Finitely Repeated Games with Mixed Strategies

The Folk Theorem for Finitely Repeated Games with Mixed Strategies — International Journal of Game Theory 24(1), 95–107 (1995)
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Olivier Gossner

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International Journal of Game Theory 24(1), 95–107 (1995)

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BibTeX citation:
@article{gossner1995,
  author = {Gossner, Olivier},
  title = {The {Folk} {Theorem} for {Finitely} {Repeated} {Games} with
    {Mixed} {Strategies}},
  journal = {International Journal of Game Theory},
  volume = {24},
  number = {1},
  pages = {95–107},
  date = {1995},
  url = {https://gossner.me/papers/the-folk-theorem-for-finitely-repeated-games-with-mixed-strategies.html},
  doi = {10.1007/BF01258206},
  langid = {en}
}
For attribution, please cite this work as:
Gossner, Olivier. 1995. “The Folk Theorem for Finitely Repeated Games with Mixed Strategies.” International Journal of Game Theory 24 (1): 95–107. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01258206.