Efficiency in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring

Kyna Fong; Olivier Gossner; Johannes Hörner; Yuliy Sannikov

Efficiency in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring

Efficiency in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring — Working paper, 2011. Stanford Graduate School of Business archive.

Authors

Kyna Fong

Olivier Gossner

Johannes Hörner

Yuliy Sannikov

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Working paper, 2011. Stanford Graduate School of Business archive.

Paper PDF Archive record

Working-paper record dated 10 April 2011, preserved in the Stanford Graduate School of Business archive.

Citation

BibTeX citation:

@report{fong2011,
  author = {Fong, Kyna and Gossner, Olivier and Hörner, Johannes and
    Sannikov, Yuliy},
  title = {Efficiency in the {Repeated} {Prisoner’s} {Dilemma} with
    {Imperfect} {Private} {Monitoring}},
  date = {2011},
  url = {https://gsbpreserve.stanford.edu/view/36215/efficiency-in-the-repeated-prisoners-dilemma-with-imperfect-private-monitoring},
  langid = {en}
}

For attribution, please cite this work as:

Fong, Kyna, Olivier Gossner, Johannes Hörner, and Yuliy Sannikov. 2011. Efficiency in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring. https://gsbpreserve.stanford.edu/view/36215/efficiency-in-the-repeated-prisoners-dilemma-with-imperfect-private-monitoring.