

Mon Sept. 8th 2008

8:30 to 9:00	breakfast	
9:00 to 9:45	Tomala	'Mechanism Design and Communication Networks'
9:45 to 10:30	Rogers	Community Structure and Network Formation
11:00 to 11:45	Ely	TBA
11:45 to 12:30	Neyman	TBA
12:30 to 2:00	lunch	
2:00 to 2:45	von Stengel	Strategic Characterization of the Index of an Equilibrium
2:45 to 3:30	Kuzmics	Hidden Symmetries and Focal Points
4:00 to 4:45	Bloch	Markovian assignment rules
4:45 to 5:30	Vohra	Voting with money

Tue Sept. 9th 2008

8:30 to 9:00	breakfast	
9:00 to 9:45	Hartline	Bayesian Foundations of Prior-Free Optimal Mechanism Design
9:45 to 10:30	Tercieux	Continuous Implementation
11:00 to 11:45	Lehrer	TBA
11:45 to 12:30	Forges	TBA
12:30 to 2:00	lunch	
2:00 to 2:45	Compte	Repeated relations with limited information processing.
2:45 to 3:30	Ekmecki	Reputation with long run players
4:00 to 4:45	Gossner	Robust Equilibria in Repeated Games

Wed Sept 10th 2008

8:30 to 9:00	breakfast	
9:00 to 9:45	Dziuda	Common Agency with Moral Hazard
9:45 to 10:30	Danan	flexibility and ambiguity
11:00 to 11:45	Sinicalchi	TBA
11:45 to 12:30	Guesnerie	Educative Expectational stability in economic contexts : the strategic substitutability's case
12:30 to 2:00	lunch	
2:00 to 2:45	Khayutin	Communication with Unobservable Constraints
2:45 to 3:30	Vieille	Strategic information exchange in repeated games
4:00 to 4:45	Siegel	Information Release in Matching Markets