Olivier Gossner
Professor of Economics and of Mathematics
Publications
Repeated games with complete information
Secure protocols – or how communication generates correlation
Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria are useful notions to understand the strategic effects of information and communication. Between these two models, a protocol generates information through communication. We define a secure protocol
as a protocol from which no individual may have strategic incentives to deviate and characterize these protocols.
Protocoles de communication robustes
Lorsque des possibilités de communication existent, un protocole désigne un ensemble de règles utilisées par les agents pour échanger de l’information. Nous définissons un protocole robuste comme un protocole duquel aucun agent n’a intérêt à dévier, et caractérisons ces protocoles.
Overlapping generations games with mixed strategies
This paper proves a Folk Theorem for overlapping generations games in the case where the mixed strategies used by a player are not observable by the others, but only their realizations are public.
The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
This paper proves a Folk Theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies. To obtain this result, we first show a similar property for finitely repeated games with terminal payoffs.