Secure protocols – or how communication generates correlation

Journal paper
Olivier Gossner
Journal of Economic Theory 83: 69-89
Publication year: 1998

Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria are useful notions to understand the strategic effects of information and communication. Between these two models, a protocol generates information through communication. We define a secure protocol
as a protocol from which no individual may have strategic incentives to deviate and characterize these protocols.

Protocoles de communication robustes

Journal paper
Olivier Gossner
Revue Économique 48: 685-695
Publication year: 1997

Lorsque des possibilités de communication existent, un protocole désigne un ensemble de règles utilisées par les agents pour échanger de l’information. Nous définissons un protocole robuste comme un protocole duquel aucun agent n’a intérêt à dévier, et caractérisons ces protocoles.

Overlapping generations games with mixed strategies

Journal paper
Olivier Gossner
Mathematics of Operations Research 21 : 477-486
Publication year: 1996

This paper proves a Folk Theorem for overlapping generations games in the case where the mixed strategies used by a player are not observable by the others, but only their realizations are public.

The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies

Journal paper
Olivier Gossner
International Journal of Game Theory 24 : 95-107
Publication year: 1995

This paper proves a Folk Theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies. To obtain this result, we first show a similar property for finitely repeated games with terminal payoffs.